The Case of Dr Rahmeh Aladwan

Dr Rahmeh Aladwan, a Palestinian Doctor practising in the UK, was subject to an interim suspension by the GMC. See https://www.mpts-uk.org/-/media/mpts-rod-files/dr-aladwan-iot_new_suspension_15-months.pdf for the decision.

The case largely concerns allegations of antisemitism. I do not know what definition of antisemitism is being employed by the GMC. They may be using the IHRA definition. This definition appears to include the making of empirical claims, which in turn would not require a belief that Jews are innately inferior.

This seems to apply to the case of Dr Aladwan to a degree, for example in paragraph 16:

" Dr Aladwan’s minimisation/denial of Jewish history in Palestine, ignoring the long history of European antisemitism;"

In the following paragraph, one of the allegations is:

"Denying the existence of or minimising antisemitism by taking a literal interpretation of the word rather than the widely accepted modern day 4 www.mpts-uk.org definitions, for example by saying that Ashkenazi Jews cannot be victims of antisemitism;"

This echoes the circularity of the Macpherson Report, whereby denials of institutional racism were treated as examples of institutional racism.

For balance, it should be stated that Dr Aladwan is also accused of endorsing violence and of doxing colleagues. It should also be noted that this is an interim decision, which did not exhibit or reproduce the offending material.

It is however, a matter of concern if a person can be subject to professional sanctions for making empirical claims, irrespective of how wrong or baseless these claims may be.

I gave my views, which have not been fully thought out, on how employees should receive protection for speech made outside the course of their employment - https://www.jsc-chambers.co.uk/post/free-speech-report-by-reclaim-response-to-the-employment-law-proposals .

With respect to sanctions by a professional body, my preliminary view is that a sanction should only be imposed if the speech is unlawful. I would consider whether some additional types of speech should allow such a sanction, but I am certain that the power to impose a sanction due to speech must be heavily circumscribed and more so than it is at present.